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I. Introduction
The government has an extremely strong interest in protecting the market
integrity for nationally traded securities. Events in American history, such
as the Great Depression and the collapse in stock prices that preceded it,
have shown what economic turmoil can result from relaxed regulation. In
response, the United States federal government and almost all states have
enacted securities or “blue-sky” legislation that impose civil and/or criminal
penalties for failure to comply with statutory requirements.1 These laws
include the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933,
and other federal and state legislation.
Following the stock market crash which preceded the Great Depression,
Congress recognized that the public had little to no confidence in the
securities market. In order to reestablish public confidence, and with the
ultimate goal of recovering the economy, Congress took action.2 Congress
enacted the Securities Act as a response to these largely unregulated
investment markets where serious abuses occurred. As part of that same
effort, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act a year later in 1934.
This act established the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The

1. Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV.
347, 348 (1991).
2. The importance of a fair and trustworthy market cannot be overstated. As SEC
Chairman William Casey once said, “we must never forget that we are dealing with a
priceless asset, the repository of the retirement hopes and educational aspirations of millions
of Americans, a unique barometer of our economic health and engine of our economic
progress. What does it take for our markets to achieve these great purposes. The markets
themselves must have characteristics of liquidity and sensitivity to economic reality. They
must be honest and fair and orderly. The public must have confidence that those
characteristics prevail. Broad public participation is essential to liquidity. Full disclosure is
essential to public confidence.”
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SEC holds the primary responsibilities of enforcing federal securities laws,
recommending securities rules, and regulating the securities industry.3
The purpose of both acts was to regulate investments in whatever form
they came in, regardless of the name brokers attached to the instruments.4
To achieve that goal, Congress painted with a broad brush when defining
“security” recognizing the endless scope of potential investment schemes
that individuals could develop in the future.5 This sweeping definition has
allowed the SEC to pursue charges against investment interests that fall
outside of the typically thought of stock certificate.
One of the most central elements of compliance with securities laws
includes the registration of investment scheme managers as brokers with the
relevant agency. Agencies, such as the SEC, require registration of certain
individuals to ensure that they are fully complying with securities law.
Registration better enables the SEC to monitor both brokers and dealers of
securities, thereby protecting the everyday purchaser of stock. While
federal securities law requires registration for many individuals engaged in
the process of selling investment interests, these pieces of legislation often
are subject to exemptions that serve as a defense for failure to comply with
statutory requirements. While some of these exemptions are statutorilybased, others arise out of common law. One common exemption to
registration is the formation of an investment operation as a joint venture or
general partnership.6
This article focuses on federal securities regulation, including
compliance with the SEC under the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act. More specifically, this paper endeavors to cover whether an
oil and gas investment operation that claims to be a joint venture can still be
exempt from registration with the SEC in the face of recent case law.
Attorneys and market participants alike are often surprised to find out that
many oil and gas interests are actually securities. As a result, securities laws
can ensnare investment promoters in litigation battles with the SEC or state
agencies. The business of oil and gas investments is a unique enterprise.
The process of funding, placing, and drilling a well followed by the
production of minerals is no simple task. The complicated oil and gas
3. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: “WHAT WE DO,” https://www.sec.
gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
4. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1990).
5. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
6. The terms “joint venture” and “general partnership” are interchangeable and
describe the organization of a business venture where an undertaking between two
individuals or companies occurs for the purpose of carrying out a particular project.
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development process has developed into a specialized industry. Further,
with the needs for energy production only increasing year by year, this
massive industry is here to stay. Expectedly, as with many investment
operations, the SEC has kept a close eye on these schemes in order to
protect the everyday investor.7
In the oil and gas industry, courts have applied the definition of a
security in broad terms, to include virtually every type of oil and gas
investment that can be created.8 Therefore, exemptions are often an
important mechanism used by investment managers to avoid registration
with the relevant governing agency. In SEC v. Kinlaw Secs., the
Commission sought to charge Kinlaw for offering oil and gas securities
without registering with the SEC.9 Kinlaw argued that the organization was
a general partnership, and thus exempt from registering their managing
venturers as brokers.10 The court allowed Kinlaw to use the general
partnership exemption, holding that the SEC failed to meet its heavy burden
of establishing that the joint venture interests were in fact securities.11 In the
after math of this case, many oil and gas promoters tried to use their
apparent status as a general partnership as a defense.12 This practice has led
to the SEC pounding smaller security operations into compliance with
mounds of litigation.13
This paper pursues the objective of informing both oil and gas
investment operators, as well as the attorneys representing these parties,
7. James Osborne, Investment Fraud is Booming Along with Oil and Gas Drilling,
SEC Says, DALLAS NEWS (Jan. 2014), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/
2014/01/04/investment-fraud-is-booming-along-with-oil-and-gas-drilling-sec-says.
8. SEC v. Arcturus Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 512, 521 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
9. 254 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 2001).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The promoters charged in the Kinlaw case later shut down their Texas investments
that the litigation was centered on and moved to Colorado. There, the promoters started a
new development company known as HEI Resources, or Heartland Energy. The company
and its promoters are currently involved in state securities litigation surrounding oil and gas
operations. The state has alleged that the promoters have lost over $68 million dollars in
investment funds following practices of offering high commissions and targeting drilling
areas known to be dry. See Aldo Svaldi, Colorado Began Investigating HEI Resources for
Securities Violation in 2002. It Just Scored a Major Victory in the Case, THE DENVER POST
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/17/hei-resources-colorado-oil-gassecurities-violations.
13. SEC v. Mieka Energy Corp., 259 F. Supp. 3d 556 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Arcturus, 171
F. Supp. 3d at 512; SEC v. Sethi Petroleum, LLC, 229 F. Supp. 3d 524 (E.D. Tex. 2017);
SEC v. Couch, No. 3:14–CV–1747–D, 2014 WL 7404127 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
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about the erosion of the joint venture exemption in the oil and gas
investment arena by examining the history of regulation in the field and
providing context from new case law. More specifically, Part II of this
paper provides background on the history of oil and gas securities and the
SEC’s regulation of these instruments. Part III offers discussion on the
potential liability of an oil and gas operation under current securities law.
Part IV examines the use of the joint venture exemption in the oil and gas
industry. This section includes how federal courts have determined liability
under the Howey test and further establishment of the Williamson factors
applied to the third prong of the Howey test. Finally, Part V proposes advice
for attorneys on how to handle the recent changes in oil and gas securities
law, and how to adequately advise clients on securities issues they may
have as they relate to oil and gas.
II. A Background on Oil and Gas Securities Regulation
A. Legislative History
The initial version of the Securities Act of 1933 contained within the
definition of a security any “certificate of interest in any oil, gas, or mining
lease.”14 As the preliminary bill was passed between the House and Senate,
slight variations of the same phrase were used.15 The House Report on the
final bill signed into law defined “security” broadly so as to encompass the
many concepts in the market that fall within the ordinary concept of a
security.16 The report further emphasized that “[t]he definition is broad
enough to include as securities, for example, certificates of interest in oil,
gas, or mining leases or royalties.”17
The following year, section 2(1) of the Act was amended by the Security
Exchange Act of 1934. The modifications deleted the language “certificate
of interest in property, tangible and intangible” and an amendment added
“certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights.”18 The final definition provided that “[t]he term
‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,

14. Securities Act of 1933, S. 875, 73d Cong., § 2 (1st Sess. 1933).
15. Peter Reilly & Christopher Heroux, When Should Interests in Oil and Gas Be
Considered Securities?: A Case For the Industry Deal, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 42 (1993).
16. H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d (1933).
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP. NO. 9323 (1933).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1314

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

or other mineral royalty or lease. . .”19 The conference report further stated
that the purpose of the amendment was to make clear that “certificate[s] of
deposit, fractional oil royalty, or leasehold interests and interests of a
similar character are included within the definition of a security and thus
subject to the Securities Act.”20
B. The Role of Texas Federal Courts
The state of Texas has produced some of the most influential oil and gas
case law in the United States. Texas’s history as a leader in oil and gas has
given Texas courts the opportunity to shape the field of law governing the
industry. Whereas Texas courts produce a lot of case law concerning the
practice of oil and gas generally, the federal district courts have been
extremely influential on oil and securities law nationally. Much of the case
law discussed in this comment concerns litigation that has occurred in
either Texas federal district courts or the Fifth Circuit. While oil and gas
securities litigation is centered in this region, much of the case law has
influenced other federal courts in different parts of the country. Just as
previous oil and gas cases have served as persuasive sources of law, these
oil and gas securities cases discussed are creating a wealth of common law
on which many other jurisdictions rely.
C. Federal Courts as an SEC Forum
When seeking to enforce securities regulations, the SEC has two options
for initiating the litigation of an enforcement action.21 The SEC can either
bring an action administratively in front of a SEC Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) or in a federal district court.22 This comment delves into the
case law created by the SEC’s litigation of illegal investment activities in
federal courts. When a case requires emergency attention, the SEC will
generally file cases in federal court instead of through an administrative
proceeding. Emergency relief, such as asset freezes or temporary
restrictions in general orders, can only be granted by a federal court and not
by an ALJ.23 Whereas litigation can move relatively quickly, administrative
proceedings are infamous for their slowness in processing claims. Another
reason the SEC chooses to litigate in federal courts is that the agency views
19. 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
20. H.R. REP. NO. 1838 (1934) (Conf. Rep.).
21. Clifford Alexander and Arthur Delibert, Litigating With the SEC: Choice of Forum,
MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE, ¶ 1030 (2015).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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a federal court injunction as more significant than an administrative ceaseand-desist order granted by an ALJ. The reason for this distinction is that an
injunction, once violated, is enforceable by an action made for contempt of
court.24 Thus, violators can be subject to strict sanctions, including prison
time. In contrast, an administrative order requires a federal court order to
enforce it in the case of a breach.
Another reason the SEC files certain cases in federal court is that the
discovery rights available to the agency are more extensive than the
research opportunities available in an administrative proceeding.25 These
extensive discovery rights allow the SEC to uncover more details about the
inter-workings of investment schemes. With more discovery rights, the
SEC has been able to shape case law in securities regulation, specifically as
applied to quasi-joint ventures in the oil and gas industry. These extensive
discovery rights are the reason the SEC has been able to not only push the
production of case law concerning the joint venture in oil and gas
investments, but also why they are able to keep winning cases. Detailed
discovery has allowed the SEC to carve out a number of factors that the
Commission believes are the mark of an operation that does not qualify as a
joint venture. As is explained later, the SEC has been able to scrutinize
agreements of particular importance to the oil and gas industry, such as
joint venture agreements and private placement memorandums.
D. Oil and Gas Interests as Securities
There are two means of analysis by which an oil and gas interest can be
defined a security under federal law. First, an oil and gas interest might be
considered security under the portion of the law that expressly defines
certain oil, gas, and other mineral interests as securities.26 Alternatively, an
oil and gas interest might be considered a security due to its status as an
investment contract.27 While this comment focuses on the latter
classification of oil and gas interests, it is important to note that the SEC
has other avenues that it can use to attack an investment operation.
As to the first option, the Securities Act includes any “fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights” in the definition of a
security.28 Further, the Exchange Act includes “participation in . . . any oil,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Nelson S. Ebaugh, Remedies for Defrauded Purchasers of Oil and Gas Interests
Under the Securities Laws, 1 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 51, 53 (2006).
27. Id.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006).
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gas, or other mineral royalty or lease” in the definition of a security. 29
While these definitions differ slightly, courts have harmonized these two
acts by mostly ignoring the Exchange Act definition.30 The outcome has
been that an oil and gas interest is a security if it is a fractional undivided
interest in an oil or gas mineral right.31
Case law provides that courts should first determine whether an oil
and gas interest is a fractional undivided interest in oil and gas.32 If an
interest does not fit within this definition, the court then may determine if
the interest is considered an “investment contract” covered by securities
laws.33
III. Liability of Oil and Gas Investment Operations
This comment will discuss the liability of oil and gas investment
operations that seek to identify as general partnerships or joint ventures, and
thus do not register their managing venturers as brokers with the SEC.
There are only two types of securities: those that require registration and
those that are exempt from registration. This idea illustrates that an
instrument that is a security must be registered in accordance with security
laws unless it has exempt status.34
While oil and gas securities fraud has been around as long as the industry
itself, recent booms in the industry caused proliferation of the number of
securities fraud cases. The SEC has brought an increasing amount of cases
each year against fraudulent investment operations. The SEC generally does
not have jurisdiction over investment operations that function as joint
ventures.35 The agency lacks jurisdiction because courts consider the
investors in these operations to be more similar to partners than merely
blind participants.36 However, the SEC has recently charged several oil and
gas investment operations with setting up illusory joint ventures that, in
reality, function as a typical investment operations.37 In these misleading
“joint venture” operations, the securities promoter will get most of the
29. Id.
30. Reilly & Heroux, supra note 15, at 46.
31. Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1988); NorTex, Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61; Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
33. Id.
34. Ebaugh, supra note 26, at 53.
35. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. Id.
37. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 520; Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
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money invested and is not incentivized to further investor prospects because
they receive payment whether or not a well pays out. These cases illustrate
a reoccurring theme of investment operators seeking to classify their
operations as exempt from registration, when in fact registration is required.
The distinction between a partner, someone participating in a joint
venture, and a shareholder, a less sophisticated investor, is significant for an
investment company. The process of registering a security with the SEC is
a costly and often rigorous activity.38 Further, the penalties for breaching
anti-fraud laws are far more stringent for investments that the SEC deems
are securities.39 Therefore, oil and gas promoters may seek to avoid
registration with the SEC by structuring an investment scheme as a joint
venture.
IV. The Use of the Joint Venture Exemption in Oil and Gas
A. Liability Under the Howey Test
The Securities Act intentionally gives a broad definition of the term
security, so as to ensure that any instrument that might be sold as an
investment is covered.40 The definition is sufficiently broad enough to
encompass almost any instrument that may be sold or purchased as an
investment.41 The Securities Act of 1933 includes in the definition of a
security any “fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights.”42 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes in its definition
“participation in . . . any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease.”43 While
these two definitions differ slightly in their classification of oil and gas
interest; courts have interpreted the two in accord to mean the same thing. 44
These definitions also include the term ‘investment contract’, but it is not
defined by either the Securities nor the Exchange Act. In SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., the Supreme Court defined an investment contract as “a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Alexander & Delibert, supra note 21, at ¶ 210.
Id.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 293.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006).
Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686.
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common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of a
promoter or a third party.”45
The Howey analysis provides a three-prong test for determining whether
an investment scheme is an “investment contract.” The test requires that
there be “(1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3)
on an expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of
individuals other than the investor.”46 The first two factors which consider
whether there is an investment in a common enterprise are almost always
met in the cases that raise issue before the courts. Therefore, the analysis in
each case often comes down to the third and final factor concerning the
expectation of profits.
The Fifth Circuit held in Williamson v. Tucker that the term “solely” is to
be interpreted in a flexible, rather than a literal, manner.47 In determining
whether parties expect profits to come “solely” from the efforts of others,
the Fifth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test, which asks whether the
efforts made by individuals other than the investor are the significant ones
which affect the success or failure of the enterprise.48 The Williamson case
further provides that the third Howey factor is established if the partnership
can be characterized by partners that that are “so dependent on a particular
manager that they cannot replace him or otherwise exercise ultimate
control.”49 Following the Williamson case, courts consider three factors
when determining whether the partners are so dependent on the efforts of
another that the scheme is actually an investment contract:
(1) An agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the
hands of the partner or venture that the arrangement in fact
distributes power as would a limited partnership; or
(2) The partner or venturer is so inexperienced and
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of
intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or

45. 328 U.S. at 298-99; see also United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(“The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others.”)
46. Id.
47. 643 F.2d at 417.
48. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)).
49. Williamson, 643 F.2d at 424.
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(3) The partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager
that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise
exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.50
The court considers the factors nonexclusively when determining whether
joint venturers participating in an investment are so dependent on another
party’s effort that the investment is actually an investment contract.51
B. The Joint Venture/General Partnership Exemption
A joint venture can generally be described as “an association of persons,
created by express or implied agreement, who combine their property,
knowledge, and efforts to carry out a single business venture for the
purpose of realizing a profit.”52 Courts have held that joint ventures, once
established, continue until there is evidence of termination by the venturing
parties.53 The main difference between a joint venture and a regular
partnership is the limited scope and duration of a joint venture.
Another important component of a joint venture is that each member
owes a fiduciary duty to each of the other members of that joint venture. 54
Thus, in a true joint venture one member may become liable to another
member for property of the venture that has been apportioned for his use.55
This level of liability is not what investors are usually expecting to take on
when they participate in an oil and gas drilling operation. Therefore, few
true joint ventures exist in the world of oil and gas investments.
Typically, a general partnership or joint venture interest is not included
in the definition of an investment contract.56 However, simply labeling an
investment as a general partnership will not prevent a finding that the
instrument falls within the jurisdiction of federal securities laws.57 Further,
the Williamson case defines the type of evidence courts should consider
when determining the expectations of control as they relate to an
operation’s status as a joint venture.58 Williamson directs court to rely on
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 47.3 (3d 2017).
53. Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 204 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1953); Donnelly v.
Guthrie, 194 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1952).
54. De Witt v. Sorenson, 288 F.2d 455, 459-61 (5th Cir. 1961).
55. Id.
56. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419-21.
57. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-49.
58. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 756-57.
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the totality of the circumstances surrounding an offer for an investment in
making a determination of the classification of an investment operation.59 In
other words, courts evaluate whether an interest is a security based on the
economic reality underlying a transaction, and not merely the name
attached thereto.60
When focusing on substance rather than form, the courts looks at
representations made by a promoter in marketing an interest and not just the
legal contracts that underlie the sale of the venture.61 Additionally, the court
considers investment conduct as relevant to determining the intent of the
parties at the time the agreement was signed.62 Further, the acts of the
involved parties even after the signature of agreements are also relevant to a
determination of the intent of the parties.63 The later participation, or lack
thereof, of investors sheds light on how the parties regarded their rights and
status under an agreement at its inception.64
In Youmans v. Simon, the Fifth Circuit stated that there remains a “strong
presumption that a general partnership or joint venture interest is not a
security.”65 The Youmans court further pushed that “[a] party seeking to
prove the contrary must bear a heavy burden of proof.”66 Therefore, district
courts generally examine each of the Williamson factors to determine if the
SEC has met the heavy burden of establishing that the interest sold by a
defendant was a security.67
While this article seeks to shed light on the disappearance of the joint
venture exemption in the regulation of oil and gas investment operations,
there are examples of less commonly used investment models that may
qualify as joint ventures. For example, an agreement amongst adjoining
landowners for the recovery of hydrocarbons establishing a lessee-royalty
owner relationship constitutes a joint venture.68 Similarly, a group acting
together to purchase an oil and gas lease that shares in the losses and gains69
59. Id.
60. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-49.
61. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943).
62. Maritan v. Birmingham Props., 875 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (1989).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986).
66. Id. (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
67. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 533.
68. Carroll v. Caldwell, 147 N.E.2d 69, 75 (Ill. 1957).
69. These oil and gas operations that actually qualify as joint ventures are typically
smaller “Mom and Pop” set ups that involve either family members or neighboring
landowners joining together to develop smaller tracts of land.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/2

2018]

The Death of the Joint Venture Exemption

1321

may also constitute a joint venture.70 However, modern securities regulation
of oil and gas investments, more often than not, involve individuals who
have not contemplated or exerted action on the management or control of a
drilling operation. Thus, these courts are highly unlikely to identify these
investors as participants in a joint venture.
C. Establishment of a Joint Venture
Joint ventures have gained popularity in the oil and gas investment sector
as a way to structure drilling investment schemes.71 More investment
organizers have opted for the joint venture structure because it combines
the benefit of joining funds while also diluting any economic risk to a
company.72 A joint venture merely involves two or more parties that jointly
undertake a commercial enterprise, but otherwise maintain their separate
identities. When one party wants to start a joint venture, they must solicit
support from one or more other parties to participate.73 In the oil and gas
cases discussed in this paper, support is usually curated by both
communicating directly with potential investors and the distribution of
persuasive documents. This sales package will include information about
the prospective drilling project, including: geological information related to
the project, data on wells from the surrounding areas, potential production
amounts, estimated costs of drilling and completing a well, and information
on how the operator acquired the right to drill (lease agreement, forced
pooling, etc).74 The operator typically provides this information through the
use of several documents discussed in more detail below. The purpose of
the sales package is to give potential investors as much information as is
reasonably necessary to allow the parties to make an informed decision
about whether or not to invest.75 This information contained in the sales
package may be presented more or less specifically depending on the
targeted potential investors experience level with oil and gas projects.
The relationship between investors and an operation is solidified through
the signing of a joint venture agreement. A joint venture is based on either
70. Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1992).
71. Adi Karev, Joint Ventures: Outlook Remains Strong Despite Ongoing Cost and
Schedule Overruns, OIL & GAS FINANCIAL JOURNAL (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-12/issue-12/features/joint-ventures.html.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. R.K. Pezold & Danny Richey, The ‘Industry Deal’ Among Oil and Gas Companies
and the Federal Securities Acts, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 827, 831 (1985).
75. Id.
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an express or implied agreement.76 Regardless, the agreement should be in
writing and should state the nature of the parties’ relationship.77 Further, the
rights, duties, and obligations of all parties involved should be clearly
expressed.78 When an agreement is silent as to certain rights or obligations,
those rights of the joint venturers are governed by the rules that apply to
general partnerships.79
A number of documents are involved in eliciting investor participation in
a joint venture, including private placement memoranda (“PPMs”), joint
venture agreements (“JVAs”), and confidential information memoranda
(“CIMs”).80 Understanding the purposes and use of these documents is
important because courts often look to these offering documents as
evidence as to the status of an investment operation. PPMs are detailed
documents that contain a summary of the investment operations. When
involving oil and gas, PPMs often cover a number of topics, such as the
terms of the offering, risk factors involved in the investment, investor
participation in costs and revenues, management of the operation, and
potential conflicts of interest. A JVA typically contains more detailed
information about the specific operations of the venture. Examples of topics
included in a JVA might include how investor money will be used to
further the operation or information on daily operations. A CIM also
provides information on the operation of the venture but may also provide
confidential details that the venture organizers do not want the general
public to know about.
D. Penalties for Failure to Comply with Federal Securities Regulations
The inquiry into whether an oil and gas interest is a security is important
because it is the question upon which civil and criminal liability hinges.
The unauthorized sale of securities is a violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c)
of the Securities Act.81 Section 5(a) makes it unlawful to use the U.S. mail
to transport “any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after
sale.”82 Section 5(c) states that it is unlawful for any individual to utilize
“interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

11 Texas Forms Legal & Bus. § 22:23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 520.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)–77(aa).
Id.
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registration statement has been filed as to such security . . . .”83 To establish
a prima facie case for 5(a) and 5(c) violations, the SEC must prove: (1)
defendants offered or sold securities; (2) the securities were not registered
as required by Section 5; and (3) defendants used the United States mail or
interstate commerce to offer or sell the securities.84 Once the SEC has
satisfied its burden, the defendant then bears the burden of proving that he
or she qualifies for an exemption from the registration requirement.85
Further, Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for a
broker who is not registered to use the U.S. mail or interstate commerce to
induce the sale of a security. The act defines a broker as “any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others.”86 The SEC asserted that hiring sales agents to contact
potential investors and compensating them with transaction-based earnings
is an example of acting as a broker.87 The Act does not define the term
“engaged in business,” but courts have defined it generally as the act of
buying and selling securities.88 Also, undefined by the Act, the court
considers a number of factors when determining if a party was “effecting
transactions.”89 These factors include: (1) whether investors were solicited
to buy securities; (2) whether the defendant was involved in negotiations
between the issuer and the investors; and (3) whether the party received a
transaction-related compensation or a salary.90
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act allows the SEC to bring a civil suit
against any individual who knowingly or recklessly provides assistance to
another person in violation of the statute. This expands the reach of the SEC
beyond investment managers to other parties involved in management, such
as promoters or organizers.
The SEC has sought a number of penalties in its suits against investment
managers, including: (1) prohibiting defendants from acting as a director of
any issuer of a class of securities; (2) permanently enjoining defendants
from soliciting investors to purchase securities; (3) prohibiting defendant’s
from participating in any oil and gas related security offering as a manager,
83. Id.
84. Dennis v. Gen. Imaging, Inc., 918 F.2d 496, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1990).
85. SEC v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1972).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4).
87. SEC v. GC Res., LLC, Case No. 3:15-cv-01048-B, 2015 WL 1522331 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 6, 2015) (Trial Pleading).
88. Id.
89. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
90. Id.
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administrator, promoter, finder, consultant, agent, or issuer; (4) ordering
defendants to pay an amount equal to funds and benefits obtained illegally,
plus prejudgment interest on that amount; and (5) ordering defendants to
pay additional civil monetary penalties as the court sees fit.91
Regarding monetary penalties and fines, Section 20(e) of the Securities
Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act authorize courts to assess
civil money penalties. Monetary fines are designed to serve as deterrents
against future violations, both for the accused and the public. When
determining fines, the court considers the following factors: (1) the
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the degree of scienter on the
part of the defendant; (3) whether the defendant’s conduct created
substantial losses or the risk of substantial losses to other parties; (4)
whether the defendant’s conduct was isolated or recurrent; and (5) whether
the penalty should be reduced due to the defendant’s demonstrated current
and future financial condition.92
The SEC retains broad authority to seek injunctive relief, such as the
suspension of investment operations of a company. Congress enacted the
Investment Advisers Act to monitor and regulate the activities of
individuals who participate in the sale of securities.93 The Investment
Adviser’s Act permits the SEC to bring civil injunctive actions in federal
district courts to seek relief against any individual who has violated or is
about to violate the Act.94 In determining whether to grant injunctive relief,
courts have looked at whether the relief was necessary to prevent future
violations. Courts have inquired into a variety of factors, including whether
the violation was an isolated incident, what degree of scienter was involved,
whether the defendant shows remorse for their actions, and whether the
defendant’s occupation places him in a position where he could commit
future violations.
E. Application of the Howey Test and Williamson Factors to Oil & Gas
Courts have applied the Howey test to oil and gas investment operations
to determine if an investment scheme is a true joint venture or not. The
third prong of the Howey test is supplemented by the three factors from
Williamson to determine if there was an expectation that profits would be
91. SEC v. GC Res., LLC, Case No. 3:15-cv-01048-B, 2015 WL 1522331 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 6, 2015) (Trial Pleading).
92. SEC v. Offill, No. 3:07–CV–1643–D, 2012 WL 1138622, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
2012).
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(b)(1)–(21).
94. Id.
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obtained from the efforts of individuals other than the investor.95 As the
analysis below shows, there are certain aspects unique to the oil and gas
business that make it nearly impossible for operators within the drilling
industry to sustain joint ventures.
1. Williamson Factor 1: Lack of power in the hands of venturers
The first Williamson factor concerns the question of whether there is an
agreement among the parties that leaves so little power in the hands of the
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a
limited partnership.96 To determine the extent of the venturers’ power,
courts look at post-investment activities.97 Court’s examine these postinvestment activities because focusing on merely the terms of the
partnership agreement would conflict with the substance over form rule
from Howey.98 This conflict would be an “invitation to artful manipulation
of business forms to avoid investment contract status.”99
The courts have refused to accept merely power for venturers on paper,
without further proof, as evidence of ample venturer control to qualify as an
investment contract.100 Under the general canons of construction, courts
give effect to the manifested intent expressed in a contract purporting to
create a joint venture.101 However, if the circumstances dictate that the
arrangement between the parties creates a status different from the language
in the contract, the court will not allow the parties’ designation to control.102
In SEC v. Arcturus Corp., the SEC filed a civil enforcement action
alleging that two Texas corporations had offered and sold interests in oil
and gas drilling projects called joint ventures, rather than security interests,
in an attempt to avoid the regulation of the SEC.103 Each of these oil and
gas offerings had a JVA that provided details on the structure of the venture
and the delegation of powers and duties.104 The JVA granted venturers
voting rights as well as the ability to call a meeting.105 These voting rights
included the ability to remove the managing venturer and amend the terms
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Williamson, 645 F.2d at 417-18.
Id. at 401.
Id.
SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 760 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. (citing Williamson 645 F.2d at 418).
SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 643 (10th Cir. 2014).
FRANCIS M. DOUGHERTY ET AL., 55A TEX. JUR., OIL AND GAS § 557 (3d ed. 2018).
Id.
171 F. Supp. 3d 512, 534 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
Id.
Id.
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of the original JVA.106 The court, however, declined to accept the JVA as
evidence that the venturers had any actual power.107 While the agreement
may have vested certain voting powers in the ventures, its voting
requirements undid that conferring of rights. The JVA required a 60%
interest vote in order to remove the managing venturer of the operation.108
While 60% may seem like a fair amount on paper, logistically this threshold
proved nearly impossible to meet because of the inability of investors to
contact one another. As was the case in Arcturus, oil and gas investment
schemes often involve investors that are scattered across the country.109 It is
hard for oil and gas operations to defend against the first Williamson factor
because of the logistics of the business involving investors that are spread
across the country. Oil and gas investors are often scattered across the
country because projects tend to be concentrated in certain geographical
areas. It can be difficult for these investors to arrange to meet and discuss
the management of the operation.
In addition to investors being scattered across the country,
communication is also difficult because of the lack of access investors have
to information about co-venturers. Investors may have the power to
organize and vote on paper, but they may not actually be able to do so in
practice if they do not have the ability to contact other investors. Investment
schemes may choose to restrict access to the organization’s books or
records for a number of reasons. This concealment of information leads to
venturers’ inability to contact one another so that they may exercise their
powers as investors. For example, in SEC v. Sethi Petroleum, the company
charged with selling securities had solicited investors from across the
United States with no prior relationship to one another, and did not provide
the investors with access to records about one another.110 The court allowed
these facts to establish that the investors had no ability to exercise the
powers they had been proscribed on paper because they had no information
about other investors that could be used to contact others.111 Sethi shows
that a court will not allow mere powers on paper to serve as evidence that
the first Williamson factor is inapplicable. Instead, investors must have a
means by which to remain in contact with another.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id.
Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
Id. at 534.
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The exact level of involvement needed by investors to ensure an
operation’s status as a joint venture is a gray area. While investors, need
real power to exert control of an operation, it is hard to state how much
control is necessary to meet that threshold. In SEC v. Couch, the court was
displeased with the fact that the defendants did not transfer title to interest
in any of the wells to the investors.112 The SEC has gone as far as to
insinuate that investors in a joint venture should have input on which wells
are drilled or regarding if a wildcat well113 should be drilled on a particular
tract at all.114 Further, the SEC has suggested investors should have input on
how operators spend and allocate investment proceeds.115 This level of
input could require investment operators to consult investors at almost
every part of the drilling process. While this input would give investors
control and purport to create a joint venture, that level of participation is
almost always disadvantageous to all parties because of the investor’s lack
of knowledge and the need for an operation to have consolidated
management.
2. Williamson Factor 2: Inexperience and lack of knowledge of
venturers
The second Williamson factor considers the question of whether the
partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business
affairs that they are incapable of intelligently exercising their partnership or
venture powers.116 This factor is also nearly impossible to defend against
for oil and gas operations. In order to determine if this factor is established,
Courts look to whether the investors were knowledgeable and experienced
in the particular industry the venture involved.117 This test derives from the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Long v. Shultz Cattle.118 In Shultz, the court
112. Couch, 2014 WL 7404127 at *8.
113. A wild cat well is a well drilled in area that is not previously known to be an oil
field. The fugacious nature of oil and gas often requires that wells are drilled in areas where
it is not known if any oil can be produced. This risky practice only adds to the notion that oil
and gas is a highly specialized and unique area of business.
114. SEC v. Petroforce Energy, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00698, 2017 WL 3139977 (W.D. Tex.
July 24, 2017) (Trial Pleading).
115. Id.
116. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423-24.
117. Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 134-35 (5th Cir. 1989).
118. In addition to offering clarification on the application of the second Williamson
factor concerning the experience of venturers, Long also provides insight into one of the
general themes perpetuated by the SEC in its lawsuits. Long again shows the idea that the
courts are not concerned with the appearance of an instrument when determining whether or
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looked at whether cattle-feeding consulting agreements were unregistered
securities.119 The Fifth Circuit refused to weigh heavily the fact that
investors in the case were experienced and successful business venturers.
Instead, the court focused on whether the investors had specific experience
in the cattle business.120
Shultz shows that courts must consider the specific nature of the business
the securities are sold within. The inquiry of the court is whether the
investors are so unknowledgeable and inexperienced in a particular area of
business that it is more likely they would “be relying solely on the efforts of
the promoter to obtain their profits.”121 Courts have often held oil and gas
investment schemes to an even higher standard, requiring not only that
investors are experienced in oil and gas, but that they have drilling-specific
experience.122 Just as general business knowledge is not enough to qualify
an investor as informed, it follows that general oil and gas knowledge might
not be sufficient satisfy the informed standard set by Williamson. Oil and
gas is a highly specialized field that most individuals are not familiar with,
especially the unique components of drilling. Most individuals looking for
operations to invest in do not have any oil and gas experience or knowledge
about the field. Therefore, it can be difficult for a group of investors to all
be both knowledgeable and experienced enough to defeat this fact.

not it is a security. This idea of substance over form is again evidenced by the fact that the
court in Long was willing to find that cattle-feeding consulting agreements were unregistered
securities. If a court is willing to find that a cattle-feeding agreement is a security, it only
follows that many oil and gas interests might be considered securities as well.
119. Shultz, 881 F.2d 134-35.
120. Id.
121. SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 762 (11th Cir. 2007).
122. To a lay person, the difference in general oil and gas knowledge and drilling
experience may seem like nothing. However, just as the oil and gas industry is highly
specialized, so are the subsections of the industry, such as drilling. Oil and gas development
is often separated into three sections: upstream, midstream, and downstream. Drilling is
included as a part of the upstream process, showing that there are plenty of other areas of oil
and gas that an investor might be involved in that are not drilling specific. The process of
drilling a well involves a number of steps; a quick summary follows. First, a drill site must
be identified, usually through the use of either a geologist or seismic testing. Next, an
operator must obtain sufficient investment to fund the drilling project. This step is where
investors are contacted and asked to participate in the drilling venture. Once money is
obtained and an operator has all of the necessary equipment and personal lined up, drilling
usually begins. If oil is obtained, the operator will have to decide how to market the oil. In
many cases oil is not obtained, leading to a loss in drilling costs and the need for the well to
be sealed.
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In addition to investors being knowledgeable, it is also important for
investment operators to be experienced in the oil and gas industry. The SEC
has been quick to note whether or not the party had oil and gas experience
when accusing an individual of acting as an unregistered broker.123 In
especially competitive areas of oil and gas production, the manager’s
knowledge might require experience in the purported area of development.
While no law currently requires investment managers to be experienced to
maintain their joint venture status, the SEC seems to increasingly include it
as a factor when deciding which investment operations to prosecute for
violations.
Courts have been especially reluctant to accept as joint ventures
operations where organizer targeted investors using cold calls. Many
smaller investments operations solicit participation in oil and gas drilling
schemes through use of lead lists. In Shields, the Tenth Circuit accepted the
marketing of oil and gas interests by use of cold calls as evidence that
investors were so inexperienced as to not be able to exercise their venture
powers.124 Courts have continued to hold that when promoters make offers
for securities through the use of hundreds of cold calls to investors with
little to no oil and gas experience, one can conclude that the investors were
so inexperienced to the level that they are incapable of exercising their
powers in the venture.125
This factor concerning the knowledge and experience of venturers has
been important in distinguishing between sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors, and its impact has been the source of controversy for decades. 126
There has long been an “industry deal” in the oil and gas business involving
the purchase of working interests by sophisticated investors.127 After testing
suitable land for oil development, an operator might prepare a sales package
to distribute to companies who have had prior dealings in oil and gas
exploration.128 Once the organization reviews the sales package, the
company decides whether to purchase a working interest in the drilling
project.129 These industry partners naturally have a better understanding of
the complexities of the oil and gas business. Therefore, lawyers have
123. SEC v. Petroforce Energy, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00698, 2017 WL 3139977 (W.D. Tex.
July 24, 2017) (Trial Pleading).
124. 744 F.3d at 647.
125. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 536.
126. Pezold & Richey, supra note 74, at 828.
127. Id. at 831.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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argued that these sophisticated and knowledgeable parties that invest in oil
and gas prospects do not need the protection of federal securities laws.130
However, while these investors may be knowledgeable about investing in
drilling operations, investment agreements may still not qualify as joint
ventures if the remaining two Williamson factors are not met. This idea
raises questions of whether an investor deserves protections even in the
event of failure of the other factors because of their prior knowledge about
the industry. As discussed, the Federal Securities Acts may give rise to a
right of recession for an operator’s failure to register an offering in a
drilling prospect as a security. While historically the oil and gas industry
has not viewed these transactions as securities, they likely fall within the
definition of a security and may warrant registration with the SEC unless
exempt. 131 Thus, the ability of the operators to obtain the status of a joint
venture, and thus be exempt from registration, is important to operations
involving sophisticated investors as well.
3. Williamson Factor 3: Venturers’ dependence on abilities of
defendants
The third Williamson considers the question of whether the partner or
venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager that they cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture
powers.132 Courts have deemed an agreement to be an investment contract if
the investors have no practical alternative to the managing venturer or they
are unable to completely exercise their powers as venturers.133 A dependent
relationship exists when the investors of an operation rely on the “managing
partner’s unusual business experience and ability in running that particular
business.”134 The Williamson court noted that even a knowledgeable partner
in an operation may be left without a reasonable alternative when there is
not a sound replacement for the manager.135 The court further reasoned that
in these situations a legal right of control has limited value if partners have
no choice but to rely on the manger’s abilities in order to continue the
operations of the venture.136
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 828.
Id. at 834.
Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422-23.
Id.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 425.
Id.; see also Merch. Capital, 483 F.3d at 763.
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The ability to remove a managing venturer is considered one of the
hallmarks of a joint venture.137 Many joint venture agreements vest in the
managing venturer complete power over drilling operations. While this may
not seem to be in the best interest of the venturers, it may actually be
required in order to commence drilling operations. Oil and gas operations
often call for power to be centralized in the hands of a single individual.138
For example, contractors may not want to do business with an enterprise
that is frequently changing its head of drilling operations.
Another factor that courts have considered as a sign of venturer
dependence on managing directors is when venturers have limited or
nonexistent access to funds.139 In Arcturus, the defendant held venturers’
money in an account that was controlled exclusively by the defendant
managers of the investment operation.140 Lack of access to accounts limits
the ability of venturers to remove the managing venturer. Even if the
venturers were able to vote the managing venturers out, they would have no
access to funds, and thus the joint venture would be at risk of failing
because it would lack assets to fund further drilling.141 Thus, the lack of
access to the funds or assets of an operation creates a picture of venturers’
complete dependence on the managing venturer.
In considering the third Williamson factor, courts may also contemplate
the representations made by promoters or others with the goal of inducing
reliance upon their unique abilities as managers.142 In Sethi, the court
looked at statements promoters made while contacting potential
investors.143 For example, the cold call regime made promises that the
operations would produce over one million barrels of oil a month and that
investors would immediately begin receiving revenue checks with return

137. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
138. The idea that an oil and gas operation needs to be centralized in the hands of one or
two individuals is another idiosyncrasy of the industry. The economic risks associated with
drilling often require power to be centralized so that there is a specific party making all of
the decisions. These decisions may include: whether to drill, what contractors to hire, when
to cease operations, and how to market the hydrocarbons should production be obtained. If
too many parties are involved in these decisions, then it could have harmful consequences
for the operation.
139. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Koch v. Hankins, 928
F.2d 1471, 1478 (9th Cir. 1991).
143. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 537.
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rates at 30-60% per year.144 Further, in the PPM promoters touted their
experience and ability to produce profits in the oil and gas industry.145
Additionally, the operation peddled its ability to make a profit in the
exclusive Bakken Shale market.146 More specifically, the Executive
Summary stated that the Bakken Shale had already been monopolized by
major oil and gas companies, and thus the ability of the company to drill in
the region would be a unique benefit to investors.147 Ultimately, the court
agreed with the SEC’s argument that the company’s purported experience
in an exclusive market, coupled with the illustrious promises made by
promoters showed that the investors were without a reasonable alternative
management option.148 Sethi shows that courts will not take lightly the fact
that promoters have made illustrious promises, and instead may weigh these
statements heavily as evidence that the investors were dependent on the
promoters.
Further, the first Williamson factor covering lack of power in the hands
of the venturers overlaps in concept with the third factor. When investors
lack power in an investment operation, it is often due to their dependence
on the management of the scheme. In SEC v. Mieka, the court accepted the
fact that the investors had expressly delegated the management of the
operations of the joint venture to the company as evidence that the
venturers were dependent on the defendant managers.149 Similarly, in
Arcturus the facts of the case showed that the venturers delegated all
powers related to the day-to-day management of the venture to the
operations manager as a managing venturer.150 The investors in that case
also delegated “the power to act on behalf of, sign or bind the Joint
Venture” or other venturers with the managing venturer through the
language in the JVA.151 Further, the agreement in that case vested in the
manager “full and plenary power” over drilling operations, and allowed the
manager of the operation to either “retain or act as operator(s)” for the
purposes of testing, drilling and completing any wells.152 The court again
found that these facts together illustrate that the venturers were dependent
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Mieka, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 562-63.
Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 524.
Id.
Id.
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on the managing venturer because he controlled all aspects of the drilling
operations, ultimately leaving investors powerless.153 This hesitation to
allow a managing venturer to control drilling operations further shows how
difficult it is for oil and gas operations to defend against this factor. If a
central party is not allowed to have general power over drilling, it may be
hard for the operation to have direction. Without a coherent direction, it
may be hard for an operation to be successful.
F. State Security Acts
While this comment focuses on federal security provisions, it is
important to note that additional registration with a state security agency
may be required.154 In Texas an aggrieved investor may have a claim under
the Texas Securities Act for the sale of an unregistered security. 155
Understanding the implications of state securities laws is important because
more oil and gas interests may fall within the definition of a security under
a state act than under the federal definition.156 For instance, the Texas
Securities Act includes many oil and gas interests that are explicitly
excluded from the definition of a federal security.157 Additionally, other
important litigation factors, such as a statute of limitations, may be different
under a state act than under federal law.158
V. Looking Forward: The Future of the Joint Venture Exemption
This rapidly emerging case law will likely require the legal community
to react to developments in oil and gas securities regulation. Attorneys are
at the front line when it comes to advising investment organizers with how
to set up and structure their investment operations. A number of factors
currently affect an attorney’s ability to advise a client coherently on
153. Id.
154. Generally, a party who purchases an oil and gas interest might have a cause of
action under state and federal securities laws in Texas if they: (1) purchase an oil and gas
interest that required registration but was not registered; or (2) are the victim of a
misrepresentation by a promoter. When dealing with the first claim, federal and Texas laws
address the type of injury similarly. However, when a claim involves misrepresentation or an
omission by the oil and gas operation, many parties opt to bring claims under Texas state
law instead of federal laws because Texas’s Blue Sky laws include more oil and gas interests
than federal securities laws. This differentiation shows why it is important for attorneys and
clients alike to be informed on securities regulation at both the federal and state level.
155. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 581-33 (West 2001).
156. Ebaugh, supra note 26, at 58.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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whether or not an operator’s classification excuses its compliance with
certain requirements from regulatory security agencies.
A. Need for Consensus in the Legal Community
There is a clear need for consensus on the question of whether the joint
venture exemption is available to oil and gas investment operations.
Attorneys who work in the oil and gas securities sector are often charged
with advising these oil and gas companies as well as promoters who seek to
procure funds from investors. Included in this advisement is usually a
suggestion on whether to register with the SEC. Currently, there is
disagreement in the legal community as to whether the joint venture
exemption is still valid in oil and gas practice. Again, while in theory the
courts have upheld this exemptions for a number of industries, the quirks of
the oil and gas business have made it seemingly more difficult for the
exemption to apply to the industry. This disagreement in the legal
community can be harmful to clients because it creates the opportunity for
situations to arise that open up investment scheme operators to liability.
Therefore, the legal community should come together to agree upon one or
more methods of better clarifying what oil and gas investment operations
are exempt from registration with the SEC based on joint venture status.
B. The Significance of Kinlaw
The Kinlaw case discussed at the beginning of this comment spurred the
common use of the joint venture exemption because the court found in
favor of unregistered oil and gas investment promoters. While it would
seem intuitive that attorneys could lean on this holding to help support their
clients, that has not been the case. Defendants have attempted to defend
their practice using this case with little luck.159 For example, in Arcturus,
defendants wrote in their reply brief in support of their motion for summary
judgment that the Kinlaw case featured very similar facts and was
comparable to theirs.160 Defendants noted that both cases featured similar
JVAs, distribution plans, legal structures, CIMs, questionnaires, and other
pertinent facts.161 The promoters further argued that they had structured
their own agreements based on the arrangement that had been approved in
Kinlaw.162 Further, defendants argued that they had imposed requirements
on membership in the joint venture that had even exceeded those in
159.
160.
161.
162.

Brief for Defendant, SEC v. Arcturus Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 512 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Kinlaw.163 Still, as previously discussed, the court found that the SEC had
established proof that the investments in question were securities that
needed to be registered.164 In fact, the court does not even discuss Kinlaw in
the Arcturus opinion.165 This treatment of Kinlaw shows that courts have
disregarded any significance it once held. Thus, defendants should not
depend on Kinlaw as a strong source of authority when arguing that an
operation qualifies as a joint venture.
C. Maintaining Joint Venture Status
If attorneys are to continue directing quasi-brokers of oil and gas
interests to utilize the joint venture exemption, they must lay out exactly
how the managers are to comply with each of the three Williamson factors.
As to the first factor, investment managers should be directed to continue
gathering investors from one region of the country, or preferably, one state.
The solicitation of investors from one region would make it more difficult
for the SEC to attack an operation as only offering sham or illusory powers
to its venturers.166 In addition to sticking to one region or when gathering
investors from one region is not feasible, managing venturers should put
investors into contact with one another as soon as possible. Further, the
managing venturer should ensure that they do not restrict investor access to
information regarding one another. This can be done in a variety of ways,
such as by compiling a secure database of all of the investors’ information
and giving access to each investor.
As to the second Williamson factor, attorneys should direct managing
venturers to refrain from the use of cold calls. While the use of cold calls
may technically be permitted in a joint venture operation, the courts have
recently viewed them as strong evidence that an interest purported to be a
joint venture is in reality an investment contract.167 Managers should
instead try to solicit investments from individuals they know or have some
professional connection with in the oil and gas industry. To ensure an
163. Id.
164. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 531.
165. Id.
166. The SEC has a limited ability to attack certain interstate transactions. The 1933 Act
exempts certain intrastate transactions from disclosure to the SEC if: (1) the security is sold
within a single state or territory; and (2) the issuer of said security is a resident and “doing
business” within said state. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). The SEC defines “doing business”
as the issuer deriving at least 80% of its consolidated gross revenues from operations within
the state, having at least 80% of assets in the state, and using at least 80% of its net proceeds
from sales within the state. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.
167. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 536; Mieka, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 558.
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investment scheme’s status as a joint venture, organizers should try to focus
not only on individuals with oil and gas experience, but more specifically
individuals with experience in the area of drilling and production. Focusing
on investors with specific drilling experience clears some of the doubt, if
present, that the investors are not experienced in the business of the venture.
The third Williamson factor is arguably the most difficult element to
comply with for managers of investment operations. Oil and gas drilling
projects often require power to be vested in the hand of sole individuals.
For example, contractors may require one individual to remain as the holder
of the lease, or listed as the operator of the well. Therefore, suggestions on
compliance with this Williamson factor can leave attorneys in a problematic
position when offering advice to clients.
For starters, it is critical that venturers retain access to the investment
funds. These funds should be kept in a separate account and not comingled
with any other monies. Keeping the money open to investors is a clearly
difficult task because of the logistics of allowing over fifty venturers at
times to rescind their funds as they please, and subsequently threaten the
stability of the operation. However, allowing venturers to have access to the
account is important because it ensures that any new managing venturer
will be able to access the joint venture’s assets to fund drilling operations.
It is also in the best interest of an investment operation to avoid
monopolized areas of oil and gas production, such as the Bakken Shale or
the Permian Basin. These areas that are dominated by several oil and gas
operations often require extensive experience and connections to enter into
an exclusive market. To courts, this exclusivity creates the appearance that
the venturers are dependent on the managing venturer, and thus without a
reasonable alternative option as to a new managing venturer.168 Managers
of investment operations must also walk a fine line when drafting their
PPM for potential investors. Courts have considered PPM’s that boast about
access to an exclusive market as evidence that the investors were without
power to remove the managing venturer.169
Managers will likely have to show that venturers have a certain amount
of control over drilling operations. This control is the most substantial piece
of proof to show that investors continue to maintain the ability to replace
the managing venturer of a drilling operation. A JVA that purports to grant
full power over the drilling operations of a project violates this ability by

168. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 537.
169. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 529-30.
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removing the power of investors to affect the direction of the drilling
operation.
While theoretically an oil and gas investment operation may be able to
retain its joint venture status in limited circumstances based on the
foregoing suggestions, it is apparent that the potential for misstep is nearly
imminent. The courts have continued to side with the SEC, resulting in case
law that supports any future allegation the agency makes against oil and gas
drilling operations. This case law shows that a number of common practices
involved in the solicitation and management of investors are evidence of an
operation’s false status as a joint venture. The purpose of this article is to
demonstrate the difficulties, and potential liabilities, associated with
attempting to maintain a joint venture in the oil and gas industry.
D. Exempting Sophisticated Investors
A greater emphasis should be placed on the second Williamson factor
involving investor knowledge and experience. Regardless of whether the
first or third Williamson factor is met, operators partnering with
sophisticated investors should be exempt from registering the SEC.170 As
pertaining to the oil and gas industry, sophisticated parties should not be
allowed to use securities laws as insurance against the risk of a transaction.
When a knowledgeable and experienced party agrees to assume the risk of
investing in a drilling prospect, they should not have the opportunity to
back out by claiming that the transaction in void because of the operator’s
failure to register the investment as a security with the SEC. A significant
amount of funding for oil and gas projects is generated from sophisticated
investors with knowledge of the complexities and volatile nature of the oil
and gas industry.171 To allow these investors to walk away from deals
170. Current federal securities law already provides certain sophisticated investors with
protection. The 1933 Act provides that transactions are exempt from registration if they do
not involve a public offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(a)(2). Therefore, private offerings are
exempt from the disclosure process. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court
determined that an offering is private if the investors in an enterprise have the ability to fend
for themselves. See 73 S. Ct. 981. Lower courts have held that an investor is independent
(making the investment a private offering) when they are both informed and sophisticated.
Further, the SEC’s rules provide that a transaction is also exempt from registration if there
are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from an issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
Additionally, a purchaser with knowledge and experience in a financial matter does not
count toward the purchaser limit. Thus, sophisticated oil and gas operations may be excused
for disclosure to the SEC if they meet these requirements.
171. Pezold & Richey, supra note 74, at 873.
171. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 831.
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would impair the ability of operators to obtain funding for drilling projects,
ultimately impairing the development of production of natural resources.172
A party who has the ability to accurately assess the risk of a drilling
operation based on its experience in the oil and gas industry should not
enjoy a free ride on an investment based on federal securities laws. The
specific realties of the oil and gas industry must be considered when
enacting and applying securities laws to a multifaceted and atypical
industry.173
To accomplish this objective, Congress should consider drafting an
exemption into federal securities laws relating to the experience of oil and
gas investors in the industry. Until 2003, the state of Oklahoma had a
statute that exempted industry deals in oil and gas from the reach of state
security laws. The pertinent section of the statute read:
Any interest in oil, gas, or mineral lease except that transactions
involving leases or interests therein, between parties, each of
whom is engaged in the business of exploring for or producing
oil and gas or other valuable minerals as an ongoing business,
and the execution of oil and gas leases by land, mineral and
royalty owners in favor of a party or parties engaged in the
business of exploring for or producing oil and gas or other
valuable minerals shall be deemed not to involve a security.174
A similar exception should be codified into current federal securities laws
in order to protect one of the working traditions of investment in the oil and
gas industry. An exception would allow for investors in need of protection
from security laws to have it but require sophisticated investors to use
172. Id.
173. This article makes the contention that sophisticated oil and gas investors should be
allowed to form joint ventures that may legally avoid registration with the SEC. These
investors should be held to an agreement made to be jointly liable in the case of failure of an
operation because of the fickleness of the oil and gas industry. Oil and gas production often
depends on the investment of experienced industry partners to get drilling started. While
much of oil and gas production is the product of larger companies, smaller drilling
operations are still active nationwide. To allow these sophisticated individuals who invest in
smaller operations the opportunity to back out of agreements because of the structure of the
operation would be devastating for the oil and gas industry. Less investors would likely lead
to less production and threaten the energy interests of the country as a whole. Therefore,
courts should weigh more heavily the second Williamson factor, concerning experience of
the investors, when determining if an operation’s joint venture status exempted it from
registration as a security interest.
174. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (West Supp. 1984-85).
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common law remedies. This distinction between knowledgeable and
unknowledgeable investors is important because it allows for an acceptable
industry practice to continue.
E. Statutory Clarification
In order to avoid lawyers being placed in the uncomfortable position
of giving conflicting legal advice, the securities statutes should be amended
to clarify the definition a “security.” Further, these securities acts should be
amended to clarify exceptions specific to the act. In addition to an
amendment exempting operations concerning sophisticated investors from
registration, other exceptions should also be carved out if deemed
necessary. For example, an amendment should be drafted to specifically
define the qualifications an investment operation must have to qualify as a
joint venture. While it is a notable point that the common law has
developed a definition for a joint venture, at a minimum this law should be
codified into federal law. This codification would allow for attorneys to
have a more specific source to point to when offering advice, thereby
dismissing some of the confusion currently present in the legal community.
Further, a federal definition would likely result in a greater consensus in the
legal community about which investment operations are required to register
and which operations may continue to operate free of SEC regulation.
Regardless of whether the definition was crafted to favor the SEC or
investment managers, greater consensus in the legal community would
benefit all parties involved.
One source of inspiration for revamping the federal securities code
might be the Texas State Securities Board’s guidelines. The agency
provides specific information on the registration of oil and gas programs.175
Under the Texas code, most individuals who serves as an officer or director
of promoters who sell interests in an oil and gas operation must be licensed
as broker-dealers.176 Further, these officers cannot be paid commission in
any form related to the sale of the interests.177 These broker-dealers are
responsible for ensuring that oil and gas interests in an operation are only
sold to appropriate purchasers.178 If the federal government were able to

175. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 121.1-121.4 (McGraw Hill 1979) (The minimum
purchase in a drilling program is $5,000.00.)
176. Id. § 121.3(d)(1).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 121.3(d)(3) (A sponsor is required to make a reasonable investigation of the
investor’s financial capacity to absorb the risk of the investment. Further, the Texas State
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codify a similar section into its code concerning registration of oil and gas
promoters, much of the confusion arising out of recent case law would
likely be resolved.
F. Continued Registration with the SEC
In the absence of change, either in legal advising or statutory
definitions, investment operations in oil and gas should err on the safe side
by registering with the SEC and following the Commission’s rules.
Lawyers should advise operators seeking external sources of funds for oil
and gas operations to secure both state and federal registration. While
discussion about securities regulation usually focuses on the implication of
case law challenging the joint venture status of operations in federal courts,
operators often must also adhere to state registration requirements.
In conveying the importance of registration, attorneys should make
several of the following points. First, put simply, there is a strong argument
that federal and/or state law require registration of an operation. While the
statute may not be clear, federal courts have put out an increasing amount
of case law explaining when the law requires registration. This increasing
amount of case law leaves little room for investors to manipulate the system
by falsely claiming exempt status for their operations. Second, because of
the increase in use of collectively generated funds to fuel oil and gas
operations, authorities at both the federal and state level have increased
their enforcement efforts. As more investors are at risk of falling pawn to
malevolent investment organizers, the SEC will likely continue to come
after operations who seek to avoid registration. The increasing amount of
cases coming out of federal district courts illustrates the determination of
the SEC to hunt down fraudulent joint venture schemes. Third, registering
with either the SEC or the relative state agency, while possibly expensive in
up-front costs, is relatively inexpensive when considering the potential fines
and litigation costs associated with violations of securities laws. Whereas
the cost of registering is not by any means a simple or inexpensive one,
litigating with the SEC is by no means cheap either. Finally, compliance
with security regulations is most often to the benefit of the operator because
fulfilment of requirements protects the operator from being penalized on
mere technicalities.179 An operator has a much greater chance of success

Securities Board requires the sponsor to retain all records necessary to substantiate the
sponsor’s assertion of investor suitability.)
179. William Powers & Don Reser, Oil and Gas Programs and Broker-Dealer Securities
Registration Ramifications, 13 ST. MARY’S L.J. 803, 823 (1982).
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when confronted with an accusation from the SEC when they have
complied with these requirements.180
While the process of registering might be somewhat taxing to an
outsider, Congress has worked to simplify the process. Congress has
delegated the responsibility of registering brokers and their employees to
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).181 NASD is a selfregulatory organization that acts under the SEC’s oversight and is funded
by members of the organization.182 Once an individual becomes licensed
with a NASD-member broker-dealer, that person is approved to sell
securities under federal law.183 The NASD requirements for licensure
include passing both a background check and an exam.184 Individuals who
are specifically interested in selling oil and gas securities can take either the
Series 7 exam covering general securities representation or the Series 22
exam covering direct participation program limited representatives.185 All
fifty states also accept NASD registration as compliant with state security
regulations.186
VI. Conclusion
The disappearance of the joint venture as an exemption to the SEC
registration requirement in the oil and gas investment industry is apparent.
Cases like Arcturus and Sethi are just a few examples of the many decisions
coming of federal district courts in Texas. Further, the SEC has continued
to file charges against more oil and gas operations for their failure to
properly register investments as securities. Additionally, when heard in
court, judges are crushing the operations with summary judgment motions.
Judges have relied on the mounds of case law created by the SEC in the
past few years. The SEC’s persistence in attacking investment schemes has
made fighting charges on these counts an uphill battle for operators who fail
to register.

180. Id.
181. John Fahy, Be Mindful of Broker-Dealer Requirements in Oil and Gas Private
Placements,
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FINANCIAL
JOURNAL
(Aug.
1,
2006),
http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-3/issue-8/capital-perspectives/be-mindful-ofbroker-dealer-requirements-in-oil-and-gas-private-placements.html.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1342

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

The recent securities regulation cases emerging from federal courts in
Texas have illustrated the reluctance of courts to grant investment
operations the joint venture status. The SEC shows no signs of letting up.
As the SEC continues to grind out mounds of case law in its favor, the
operator standard for proving a joint venture exists is only raised higher.
The importance of lawyers understanding the ramifications of securities
dealings cannot be understated. Operators who fail to adhere to federal
security law requirements face potentially severe penalties from the SEC.
The potential for penalty should be worrisome to the legal community,
especially when there is not a clear consensus on whether or not the joint
venture exemption is still available as a defense. Attorney’s practicing in
both securities and oil and gas law should work to affect adequate outcomes
for their clients involved in these specialized investment operations.
Lawyers in most cases should recommend to their clients involved in the
oil and gas drilling industry to register their investment operations whether
or not they think they qualify as joint ventures. The cost of failing to
register, whether in litigation costs or fines imposed by the SEC, almost
always outweighs the initial cost to register and comply with SEC
requirements. A simple cost-benefit analysis should lead even the chanciest
operator to register.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/2

